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Abstract
This paper argues that the introduction of compulsory schooling in early industrialization
promoted the growth process that eventually led to a vicious cycle of population aging and
negative pressure on education policy. In the early phases of industrialization, public education
was undesirable for the young poor who relied on child labor. Compulsory schooling therefore
discouraged childbirth, while the accompanying industrialization stimulated their demand for
education. The subsequent rise in the share of the old population, however, limited government
resources for education, placing heavier nancial burdens on the young. This induced further
fertility decline and population aging, and the resulting cycle may have delayed the growth of
advanced economies in the last few decades.
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1 Introduction
This paper argues that the introduction of compulsory schooling in early industrialization promoted
the growth process that eventually led to a vicious cycle of fertility decline, population aging, and
negative pressure on public education policy. This cyclical process may have decelerated the growth
of advanced economies in the last few decades and possibly in the future.
A broad picture of the proposed hypothesis is represented by the ow chart in Figure 1. Public
education was perceived as a duty in the early phases of industrialization, where households relied
on the labor of their children. Imposing compulsory schooling discouraged childbirth by regulating
child labor and, more indirectly, by promoting technological progress. This eventually led to a major
education reform (i.e., the extension of public education), when child education rather than child
labor became desirable for most young households. However, the accompanying fertility decline,
which skewed the age distribution toward the old, enhanced their political power and then squeezed
the government budget for education. This induced higher spending on private education, lower
fertility, and further population aging. Since the positive reaction of private education reects the
widespread demand for skills, this cyclical process is a phenomenon indigenous to the industrialized
stage.
This socioeconomic structure sheds light on the historical relationship between public education
and demographic change in the era of modern growth. Table 1 presents the long-term trend in the
related variables for major advanced countries. Although the timing varies across those countries,
the share of public education in total government expenditure, E=G, reached a peak after the birth
rate, B, began steadily decreasing.1 That is, these countries had a period in which public education
and fertility evolved inversely, and no monotonic relationship is observed between demographic
change and the budget allocation to public education.
In light of historical evidence presented later, we argue that these asymmetry trends reect
the decline in child labor under the half-time system in education, followed by the switch of
parental strategies toward investment in child education. On the other hand, the subsequent par-
allel trends monotonic decline in public education and fertility followed by population aging are
1As for France, only central government expenditure is considered in both E and G in Table 1. Thus, the ratio
E=G does not take into account nancial transfers for public education between central and local governments. This
deciency might be associated with its sharp rise between the years 1954 and 1975.
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explained by the vicious cycle in Figure 1. Indeed, consistent with the positive reaction of private
education in the gure, the last decade witnessed several OECD countries raising the relative bur-
den of private to public education spending, as presented by Table 2. The underlying government
failure to meet the householdsgrowing demand for schooling would have discouraged childbirth
and accelerated population aging in those countries.2
In order to encompass the dynamic process shown above, this paper develops a growth theory
that incorporates ve key elements. First, parents face a trade-o¤ between the quantity and quality
of children, as formulated in standard models of fertility and education, such as Becker et al. (1990)
and Galor and Weil (2000).3 Second, public and private education are substitutes for each other in
terms of skill acquisition. Those two properties together generate a potential link between education
policy and fertility, as shown by Figure 1. In response to a decline in public education, households
in industrialized stages spend more on private education by having fewer children.
Third, public education imperatively takes away the time children have for paid work. Their for-
gone wages therefore equal the opportunity costs of child education. Fourth, technological progress
is assumed to be age-biased. This improves the productivity of adult workers over that of children,
and thus makes sending children to school more benecial than having them work.4 Fifth and
nally, old generations have limited altruism; they basically prefer public services that directly and
immediately benet themselves, such as pensions and health care, over public education. This leads
to age-cohort di¤erences in the stances toward education policy.5
This research plays a complementary role in the recent and growing literature on demographic
change and macroeconomics in political-economy frameworks. It appears that no established theory
2Population shrinking is one of the upcoming issues for some advanced countries. As for Japan, the natural
increase rate of the population became negative in 2005 for the rst time after 1920 (Statistic Bureau, Ministry
of Internal A¤airs and Communications, 2008, p. 4). A French demographer Bourgeois-Pichat estimates that the
population of European countries would die out within 300 years if their fertility rates were and remained at the West
German level (Johnson et al., 1989, p. 3).
3This paper advances the unied growth theories developed by Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor and Moav
(2002), who explore the transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth through the demographic transition.
In contrast to their approach, this article incorporates endogenously determined public education to analyze its
relationship with fertility. The other four properties discussed are also added in the present model.
4A similar sector-biased technological progress is employed by Hazan and Berdugo (2002), who explore the depar-
ture from the poverty trap where child labor is prevalent. One of the di¤erences from their research is that the present
paper emphasizes the role of compulsory and universal investment in education, rather than population growth, as a
driving force for the abandonment of child labor.
5Using the American National Election Survey for 1988, Vinovskis (1995, pp. 202209) nds that additional federal
assistance for public schools is supported by 77.1% of interviewees aged through 1829 and only by 46.9% of those
aged 70 and above. Furthermore, her multiple classication analysis veries this trend by controlling for the e¤ects
of other factors such as sex, race, education, family income, and so on.
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has examined the interrelationship between public education, private education and demographic
changes, despite its importance for the assessment of education policy in aging societies. As dis-
cussed below, while there are three related seminal theories, these can be interpreted as partial
theories from the perspective of this research.
First, Galor and Moav (2006) demonstrate the mechanism of the birth of public schooling on
the course of industrialization in the West. They highlight the prot rates of capitalists in forming
their policy preferences, in the presence of capital-skill complementarity. Unlike the present paper,
their growth theory implies the monotonic evolution of education policy, excluding the possibility
of its aggravation in industrialized stages. Furthermore, in their scenario, education reform occurs
without any political conict, in sharp contrast to our focus on compulsory education enforced on
the poor against their will.6
Second, Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) explore the mechanism of child labor legislation. By noting
the lock-in e¤ect of fertility decisions on policy preferences as well as the eroding e¤ect of child labor
on the unskilled wage, they reveal the possibility of multiple equilibria such that child labor may
or may not be abolished. While their attention is directed at the early stages of industrialization
where child labor prevails, the present study builds on a longer-term perspective to encompass
subsequent population aging that provokes political confrontation between generations.
Finally, Holtz-Eakin et al. (2004) develop a growth model where the age composition of the
economy is a prime determinant of the allocation of public resources.7 They demonstrate that a
fertility decline alters the policy preferences of the median voter in favor of the elderly, who have
a low priority for education. However, unlike the present article, their analysis leaves unexplored
an opposing causality: the e¤ect of education policy on demographic factors. This is because
their model abstracts from parentschild-rearing strategies by assuming exogenous fertility and no
private education.
Those added features build on various omitted elements such as physical capital, agricultural
land, pecuniary externalities, and international trade. Our theory predicts their potential impacts,
which are presumably country-specic, on the progress of early education reforms and industrial-
6This di¤erence is largely owing to the fact that the present article highlights the role of compulsory education as
a child labor regulation. As evidenced in Section 2, early factory legislation required education attainments for child
workers while limiting their work hours.
7Similar demographic approaches are employed in Kemnitz (1999), Pecchenino and Utendorf (1999), and Gradstein
and Kaganovich (2004). All of these, however, assume exogenous population growth.
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ization. Furthermore, it is shown that the depth of the downward spiral in the developed stage
would depend on how to allocate the government budget for education between various types of
skills. Hence, this research o¤ers theoretical implications for the observed cross-country variations
in public education, population aging, and growth performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents historical evidence
supporting the central thesis of the paper. Section 3 describes the basic structure of the growth
model and solves optimization problems. Section 4, as the main part of the paper, analyzes the
process of industrialization that encompasses the transition into the aforementioned vicious cycle.
Section 5 discusses the underlying assumptions and the robustness of the model, and considers
the implications for comparative economic development. Section 6 concludes the discussion and
addresses a direction of future research. The proofs of technical results and the description of the
data used are provided in the Appendix.
2 Historical and Empirical Evidence
This section presents historical and empirical evidence supporting the central thesis of the paper.
The focus here is placed on the experiences of advanced economies Japan, the United States, and
Western Europe over the last two centuries. Consistent with the theory developed below, it shows
that industrialization forces triggered the decisive shift of individualsattitudes toward child labor
and education. The last part of the section summarizes the empirical evidence for the relationship
between population aging and gray power.
2.1 Public Education as a Duty
The notion of compulsory education as a duty has been embraced by the poor, who live from
hand to mouth and need the earnings of their children. In the early stages of their industrial
revolutions, these countries employed children, and their respective child labor regulations and
education reforms were disagreeable for the lower class. As a result of compromise, early education
reforms were designed to provide special classes for working children. On the basis of this historical




It is widely recognized that the Japanese industrial revolution took place after the Meiji Restoration
in 1868. Ohkawa and Rosovsky (1965, p. 66; 1978, p. 142) argue that modern economic growth
began in the mid-1880s. Similarly, Rostow (1978, p. 425) dates the years 18851905 as the period
of the take-o¤.
Japans modern education reform was launched with the proclamation of the Educational Sys-
tem Order in 1872, which aimed for egalitarian education by establishing school districts throughout
the country.8 The law made four-year elementary education compulsory, along with the charging
of school fees (Taira, 1978, p. 196). An educational system in the early stages of development such
as this placed a heavy, unbearable nancial burden on the lower classes at that time. As described
by Taira (ibid.), To poor farmers, compulsory education appeared as an encouragement to the
children to loaf in school when they could be helping on the farm. In some poorer parts of Japan
there were a number of riots against compulsory education, in which hundreds of school buildings
were destroyed.9
In fact, statistical records indicate that not many children were sent to primary school in the
early years of industrialization. The classroom attendance rate was approximately 20.44% in 1873
and 31.24% in 1890, and exceeded 50% for the rst time in 1900 (Japanese National Commission for
Unesco [sic], 1966, p. 64).10 According to the estimation by Umemura et al. (1988, pp. 8083), the
employment rate of male children aged between 10 and 14 was approximately 60% in 1872, reaching
nearly 50% in 1894, 40% in 1899, and 30% in 1909.11 They also show that the corresponding gure
for female children was initially lower (52.2% between 1872 and 1880) and less variable over time.
This appears to be plausible because many girls in the Meiji period were perhaps supposed to
engage in babysitting or housekeeping.
In order to encourage education for child workers on or o¤ labor markets, some forms of half-
8Although there were many small schools for reading, writing, and arithmetic before the Meiji Restoration, they
were typically run privately with no subsidies from the government (Dore, 1964, p. 176). For a comprehensive English
survey of the development of Japans modern educational system, see the webpage of the Ministry of Education
(http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/hpbz198103/index.html).
9See Taira (1971, p. 373) for similar discussions.
10While the commission also reports the rate of school attendance, they believe that the rate of classroom attendance
provides more accurate information about actual attendance; the former is dened as an o¢ cial ratio of the number
of children attending school to the total number of the school-age children,whereas the latter is the ratio of average
daily attendance to the total number of the school-age children (ibid., pp. 6465).
11These gures would be underestimated because of the assumption that all registered students were unemployed.
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time education were introduced in the late 19th century. In 1875, the city of Tokyo permitted
night classes opened by private elementary schools and, in 1876, permitted night classes by public
elementary schools (Ishii, 1992, p. 25). In 1894, the Ministry of Education ordered local governments
to develop special curriculums for children who could not manage to attend regular classes (Saito,
1996, p. 83). Between 1876 and 1930, no less than 300 schools for childminders were established
across 36 prefectures (Osada, 1995, Table 16, pp. 214215).
2.1.2 The United States
As is well known, there were regional di¤erences in the timing of industrialization in the United
States. The economic take-o¤ of New England occurred in the period 18151850, whereas that of
the American North occurred in 18431870 (Rostow, 1978, p. 392). In the north-eastern region, the
share of child workers employed in manufacturing was 23.1% in 1820 (Goldin and Sokolo¤, 1982,
p. 748). It is estimated that in 1832, children amounted to about 40% of factory workers in New
England (Weiner, 1991, p. 142). The proportion of child labor would have been much higher in
agriculture, a dominant sector in the early 19th century.12 At the national level, about one-sixth of
children between the ages 10 to 15 were gainfully employed even in 1880 (Sanderson, 1974, p. 297;
Weiner, 1991, p. 145).
One of the principal obstacles to universal education conceivably was how to bring children
out of their workplaces to school. Hence, early education reforms were presumably a compromise
between the need for child labor and that for child education. In the late 1830s, industrial states
passed laws, which required factory children to go to school three months every year (Church,
1976, p. 59). In 1836, Massachusetts legislated that (at least) three months of school attendance
was required, in advance, for the employment of children under the age of 15 in manufacturing
(Weiner, 1991, pp. 142143). Under the Massachusettslabor-attendance law in 1842, it was the
duty of the local school committees to secure the school attendance of children, while all factory
children under the age of 12 were prohibited from working more than 10 hours a day (Ensign, 1969,
p. 49).
12 In 1820, the proportion of workers employed in agriculture was 73% in New England and 74% in the Middle
Atlantic (Goldin and Sokolo¤, 1982, p. 748).
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2.1.3 Britain
Child labor played an important role even in early 19th century Britain, one of the most advanced
economies at that time. In 1816, workers under the age of 18 accounted for 51.2% of workers
in the British cotton industry, and 60.2% in the Scottish ax industry (Nardinelli, 1990, p. 109).
The Census of England and Wales records that at least 36.6% of boys aged 1014 were working
in 1851 (Cunningham, 1996, p. 42). The earnings of children were an important income source
of the working class. In the period from 1817 to 1839, records show that the children of mining,
factory, and outworking workers earned 23.9%, 28.2%, and 27.5% of household income, respectively
(Horrell and Humphries, 1995, p. 491).
These gures indicate parentshesitation in sending their children to school at that time. For
instance, the records of the Mitcham National School show that during the years 18301939, the
average length of stay of pupils was 34.5 months, and 57% of boys left school to start work (Madoc-
Jones, 1977, pp. 45, 47). Even in 1889, the London School Board issued as many as 96,450 initial
notices to parents failing to send their children to school (Rubinstein, 1977, p. 245).13 Furthermore,
there is a view that the London poor, estimated to be 30.7% of the population in 1891, opposed
education for their children, in part because those poor needed the earnings of their children (ibid.,
pp. 235236). It is conjectured from these gures that the rst half of the 19th century saw
widespread, intense opposition to compulsory education.14
In these circumstances, early factory legislation made a reconciliation between regulating child
labor and promoting child education. As in the other nations concerned here, compulsory ed-
ucation became gradually e¤ective through legislative amendments. The Factories Act of 1833
imposed two-hour schooling on six days a week on working children aged 9 to 11 in the main textile
industries, although its implementation was tough for factory inspectors (Silver, 1977, p. 141). The
performance of the current law and countermeasures were reported to the government periodically
by four factory inspectors, and their opinions were reected in the Factory Act of 1844 (Hutchins
and Harrison, 1926, pp. 71, 85). As stated by Silver (1977, p. 141), the law marked a turning point:
The half-time system, foreshadowed in the early Factory Acts and e¤ective from 1845, began as a
13Hurt (1979, p. 155) introduces two court cases, from The Times in November 1875, in which the London School
Board was involved. They show that compulsory school attendance was a big burden on the poor.
14Hopkins (1994, p. 142) presents an anecdotal episode in the mid-19th century Black Country: A prevailing
proverb at that time was The father went to the pit and made a fortune; the son went to school and lost it.
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strategy for combating excessive child labour and became, in the 1850s and 1860s, an educational
theory.
2.1.4 France
As in Britains case, the progress of French education reform was gradual. The education law in
1833 made primary education universally available (Weissbach, 1989, p. 3). Nevertheless, that was
not fully made use of by the impoverished, who needed child labor for their daily life. In 1840,
more than a quarter of the children aged 6 to 12 in France did not attend school in part because
their labor was needed at home (ibid.).15
Evidence shows that children were working for their families out of necessity, at least before
the mid-19th century. According to a study published in 1840, it cost 960 francs a year for a
four-member family to live in Melhouse, whereas a laborer or dyer in the local cotton industry
could earn at most 450 francs a year (Heywood, 1988, p. 108). As for handloom weavers in Rouen,
the annual cost of living, 912 francs, was greater than the standard parental income, 861 francs
(ibid., pp. 108109). In the mid-1840s, several school inspectors found that school attendance in
rural areas declined when bread became expensive (ibid., p. 88). This indicates a low priority of
education among household expenditures.
Given the economic importance of children, it is not surprising that France began its education
reform while accepting child employment. Evening classes were held by the municipality in Mul-
house in the early 1830s, and in Lille in the early 1840s, although they were not very successful
(ibid., pp. 244245). The child labor law passed in 1841 provided a certain level of education for
children under 12 years, while regulating the minimum age of employment to 8 (Ogg and Sharp,
1926, p. 382). Faced with working class opposition, this rst child labor law was ine¤ective, and the
child labor law passed in 1874 was more e¤ectively enforced by a special inspectorate (Nardinelli,
1990, pp. 126127, 137).
2.1.5 Germany
In Prussia, the rst school edict was issued as the General-Landschul-Reglement of 1763, with
the aim of providing compulsory education for all children aged 5 to 13 (Melton, 1988, p. 174).
15 In 1840, 756,464 boys were in communal primary schools in winter; however, the number of boys attending
declined to 463,464 in summer, possibly a season when their labor was especially needed at home (ibid.).
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However, such an early attempt was fruitless. The four schools in Berlin, Kloster Berg, Stettin, and
Königsberg produced far too few graduates to meet the goals of the reform (ibid., p. 175176).
One of the reasons for the failure was the need for child labor for the poor. Indeed, summer school
was impossible to run because rural families, especially in summer, needed their children to be
working (ibid., p. 176).
Similarly, 40 out of about 100 petty schools in Bremen were closed between 1788 and 1810,
during which children found new work opportunities in tobacco processing (Cunningham, 1995,
p. 103). This indicates that a large proportion of households in Bremen gave priority to child
labor over child education at that time and probably in earlier periods as well. During the period
18001846, children under the age of 14 accounted for 10%20% of factory workers (Lee, 1978,
p. 466). In particular, until the 1850s, children were of great assistance in textile factories, where
their hands were suitable for picking up the threads (ibid.). Even around the end of the century, a
rather huge share of children was engaged in part-time work. A survey by the Prussian government
at that time reports that 40% of all school children spent at least 18 hours of the week working
(Berghahn, 1994, p. 81).
Under these circumstances, early education reform encountered di¢ culties in its enforcement.
The Prussian law of 1839 obliged children under the age of 16 to attend ve hours of school a
day, while limiting their work time to ten hours a day (Ogg and Sharp, 1926, p. 389). However,
the execution was unpleasant and impossible for authorities such as the local police, teachers,
and clergymen and, accordingly, the schooling time was curtailed to three hours a day in 1853
with limited enforcement (ibid., pp. 389390). One can imagine from these events that the local
authorities had sympathy for poor children who were working for their families. Similar results
were observed in other German states such as Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, and Hesse; they failed
to restrict child labor and spread public schooling (ibid., p. 390).
2.2 Public Education as a Right
More recently, compulsory education is widely perceived to be essential for securing the minimum
living standard in advanced countries. In fact, children in OECD countries attend 11.9 years of
schooling on average (OECD, 2006, p. 41), exceeding or very close to the duration of compulsory
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education in most cases.16 This fact, along with the evidence given in Section 2.1, suggests that
the notion of compulsory education for their citizens had shifted from a duty to a right.17
The acceptance of compulsory education became widespread around the turn of the 20th cen-
tury, although the timing varied across countries. In Japan, the aforementioned classroom atten-
dance rate at primary level rose to 89.63% in 1913 (Japanese National Commission for Unesco [sic],
1966, p. 64). This implies that most school-age children kept going to primary schools after being
enrolled. In the United States, 32.3% of children aged 14 to 17 were enrolled in secondary schools
in 1920, a sharp increase from 6.7% in 1890 (Church, 1976, p. 289). In Secondary Education for
All, published in 1922, the British Labour Party suggests the need for post-elementary education
for working-class children (Hopkins, 1994, p. 321).18
This hypothesis is supported by Nardinelli (1990), who investigates the historical evidence for
Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States. He argues that As working-class incomes
rose, parents kept children out of the labor force until later and later ages. The production of well-
educated children became a realistic and desirable alternative for the working-class family in the late
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The desire of parents to improve the quality of their children
would have been su¢ cient, in the absence of child labor laws, to remove children from factories in
the long run (p. 149).The minor e¤ect of child labor laws on school levels is also found by Landes
and Solmons (1972) regression analysis for the U.S. states in the late 19th century.
While there were various industrialization forces underlying the increased demand for public
education, two of them are emphasized as particularly important in this paper. The rst force
is the rise in the net return on education investment; it motivated parents who have far-sighted
views on child-rearing. By 1880, Félix Pécaut, the apostle of progressive education in France,
reported that families began to notice the advantage of obtaining a school certicate for nding
jobs, inducing parents to permit longer school attendance by their children (Weber, 1976, pp. 73,
328). Likewise, high school education in the United States began to be regarded as a means to
secure white-collar occupations emerging at the end of the 19th century (Church, 1976, p. 290).
16 International data for the duration of compulsory schooling are provided online by the UNESCO Institute for
Statistics (http://www.uis.unesco.org/).
17This point has been emphasized by many scholars. See Shibuya (1988, p. 167) for Japans case, and Weiner
(1991) for a more comprehensive analysis.
18 In 1950, the share of secondary school pupils in the 1019 age group reached 33.7% in England and Wales (Flora
et al., 1983, pp. 626).
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In Britain at that time, secondary and university education were increasing their importance in
achieving or maintaining social status (Glass and Grebenik, 1965, p. 117). In terms of the cost,
technological progress reduced the forgone wages of children attending school. Lee (1978, p. 467)
argues that upgraded machines made a signicant contribution to the 30% decline in child labor of
German textile factories between 1846 and 1853, a period when child labor legislation was poorly
enforced.
The second force is the improvement in parental incomes; it abated householdsdemand for
child labor to secure current subsistence and possibly allowed them to be concerned about the
future well-being of their children. In the United States, the aforementioned spread of secondary
education was in part because of rapid, widespread growth in per capita income after 1900, which
would have allowed more families to keep sending their children to school without relying on their
forgone wages (Church, 1976, pp. 289290). Similarly in France, fewer children were in the labor
force in the second half of the 19th century, during which real wages kept rising (Heywood, 1988,
p. 109; Nardinelli, 1990, p. 146). In Britain, the average real wage over the period 19001909
increased to almost twice the level of the period 18501859 (Polland, 1978, p. 171). The improved
living standard is consistent with judicial records in the late 19th century. Although truancy was
the second most common violation between 1888 and 1916, the number of prosecutions reduced by
half between 1883 and 1910 (Hurt, 1979, p. 203). Finally, in Japan, the real GDP per capita more
than doubled between 1900 and 1955 (Maddison, 2001, p. 206), and the entrance rate for higher
secondary schools exceeded 50% in 1955 (Japanese National Commission for Unesco [sic], 1966,
Table 27, p. 78).
2.3 Population Aging and Gray Power
It is not di¢ cult to imagine that old generations have an inuential political voice in aging democ-
racies, as they would command a large share among all the voters. For fear of excessive gray power
in the political process, there is a debate in Japan about the lowering of the voting age from 20
to 18 (cf. Nishida, 2008; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2008). According to the data presented by Pre-
ston (1984), the postwar aging of the U.S. society is accompanied by improvements in the relative
well-being of the elderly to children.19
19This would be to some extent the result of the lobbying activities by some demographic groups such as the
American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) and the National Council on Aging (NCOA). They expanded their
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One of the premises of this paper is that population aging hinders the allocation of public
resources from meeting the youngs growing demand for education. The premise does not necessarily
entail the rise in a public spending bias toward the old. Even if the bias improved, the budget
allocated to public education may be insu¢ cient to shorten the gap with the private demand for
education. Nevertheless, it would be reasonable to consider that the generational bias such as this
is likely to raise the burden of private education.20
By looking at social spending growth of ten OECD countries between 1960 and about 1980,
OHiggins (1988, pp. 218220) nds the general lack or loss of priority of public education over
pensions and health care, apart from the change in age structure. Poterba (1997, 1998), using U.S.
panel data between 1961 and 1991, suggests that state and local spending on education per child is
inversely correlated with the fraction of the elderly population within states. Employing Poterbas
approach, Ohtake and Sano (forthcoming) nd similar patterns across Japanese prefectures after
the 1990s. Neither Poterba nor Ohtake and Sano considers higher education, which would gain
less support from the elderly than would basic education would (cf. Vinovskis, 1995, p. 208).
Perhaps government expenditure on higher education would be more vulnerable to the pressure
from population aging. For earlier periods, the regression results of Lindert (1994), based on the
18801930 panel of 21 (mostly currently advanced) countries, indicate that aged countries tend
to have large public spending on social transfers including pension and health subsidies, and low
primary- and secondary-school enrollment rates.
3 The Model
Consider a one-sector, closed economy operating over an innite discrete-time horizon. In perfectly
competitive environments, producers generate a single homogeneous nal good by employing labor.
Growth in output per worker is driven by investment in human capital and technological progress.
The economy has an overlapping-generations structure. A new generation, consisting of a con-
tinuum ofNt individuals, is born at the beginning of every period t and lives for three periods. Thus,
political power in the 1960s (Longman, 1987, p. 234), and the AARP, in particular, has grown to be the largest
politically active group, comprising 35 million members (The Economist, 2005, p. 40).
20Pampel (1994) examines age inequality in public spending, which, however, does not include educational expen-
ditures. Based on annual data of 18 advanced industrial democracies between 1959 and 1986, the regression analyses
reveal the following political conditions under which population aging raises a public spending bias to the old: weak
leftist parties and the lack of class-based corporatism.
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there are three generations (children, adult, and elderly) at each point in time. The government
imposes a tax on the adult generation to support the other members of the population.
3.1 Firms
The nal good is produced in one sector, where competitive rms employ adult and child workers.
The economy has no access to physical capital and land.21 Let Ht and Lt be the aggregate levels of
adult labor in e¢ ciency units and of child labor, respectively, employed in period t: The aggregate
level of output produced in period t, Yt; is generated by the production function
Yt = At(Ht + tLt); (1)
where At > 0 is the level of technology, and t is the marginal productivity of child relative to
adult labor in period t: For simplicity, it is assumed that tAt = w; where w > 0 is a xed value;
that is, the marginal productivity of child labor in absolute terms is stationary at w over time.22
Without loss of generality, the price of the nal good is normalized to unity. Standard prot
maximization reveals that the wage rate per unit of e¢ ciency labor in period t, denoted as wt;
equals the marginal labor productivity; i.e., wt = At: On the other hand, w equals the competitive
wage rate per unit of child labor.
3.2 The Government
As a form of taxation, the government imposes public service obligations on adult individuals. Each
of them is obliged to serve a xed time fraction  2 (0; 1). The resulting government revenue in
period t, Nt, is spent entirely on education for children and the welfare of the elderly in the same
period.
The level of public (compulsory) education in period t, egt ; is dened in terms of the government
expenditure per child-rearing household in the period.23 This implies that egt 2 [0;  ]: On the other
hand, the old-age related service in period t, xt; is dened as the government budget allocated to
21Section 5 considers how the basic results would be a¤ected by relaxing the assumptions on production environ-
ments.
22Without the stationarity of tAt, the basic results would be retained as long as the relative marginal productivity
of child labor, t; is eroded by technological progress. As will be shown later, the decline in t induces parents to
shift from the use of child labor to the education of children.
23The case with per child expenditure, an alternative formulation, is considered later in Footnote 40.
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each old individual in the period. It follows that
xt = (   egt )nt 1; (2)
where nt 1  Nt=Nt 1 denotes the ratio of the adult to the old population in period t: A rise in egt
shifts the government spending from the elderly to children, leading to a reduction in xt. A rise in
nt 1 increases the number of taxpayers per old individual, and thereby increases xt:
3.3 Households
3.3.1 The Environment
Consider the life stream of an individual i (= a; b) of generation t (born in period t   1): In the
rst period (childhood), the individual works and/or receives education. These decisions are made
by his/her single parent, who uses child labor income, and also by the government.
In the second period (adulthood or parenthood), the individual serves for the government and
allocates the disposal time 1     T between working and child-rearing. Depending on the
education in childhood, the individual acquires hit units of skills in this period. Meanwhile, the
individual raises nit units of children by spending a time fraction + e
i
t per child, where  > 0 is the
xed cost and eit is the level of private education. Each of these children equally supplies l
i
t units
of raw labor to earn wlit. These wage incomes are spent on their family consumption, c
i
t, with no
savings. It follows that the budget constraint is
cit  zit[T   nit( + eit   !it)]; (3)
where zit  wthit denotes parental potential income, and !it  wlit=zit is the child labor income in
terms of the parents time.
In the third period (elderhood), the individual retires and consumes xt+1 units of the old-
aged related service for free of charge. The old individual is economically independent of his/her
descendents, and no direct transfers occur between them. There are no heterogeneities among the
retired within generations.
Preferences are dened over consumption in adulthood, the quantity of children, the average of
their future potential incomes, and the old-aged related service provided in elderhood. The lifetime
utility function of an individual i of generation t is given by
uit = (1  ) ln cit + [lnnit + ln(wt+1hit+1)] + min(xt+1; ); (4)
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where  2 (0; 1); and  > 0 is a saturation point above which xt+1 has no e¤ect on uit. Thus,
abundant public resources incline the elderly to bear the costs of other services, and in this sense 
measures the degree of selshness. The elderly with an extremely large  essentially have a linear
preference over xt+1; implying no altruism.
3.3.2 The Formation of Child Labor and Human Capital
Once determined through a political process, the level of public education egt is enforceable on any







8<: > 0 if eit 2 [0; e^t);= 0 if eit  e^t; (5)
where l1(eit; e
g




t ) < 0 in the rst case, and l(0; 0) = 1.
24 The critical value e^t is set
to be nonnegative and is given by a single-valued, decreasing function e^(egt ):
25 The properties of the
function is represented by the Child Labor Frontier, on which eit = e^(e
g
t ); in the lower right panel
of Figure 4. Any pair (eit; e
g
t ) on and outside the frontier exhausts the time of children, leading to
l(eit; e
g
t ) = 0.
It follows that the earnings of a child i in period t, !it  wlit=zit; depend on the levels of education






 !(eit; egt ; zit); (6)
where the function ! is nonincreasing in each argument. In light of (3), this shows that the forgone
wages of children are the costs of schooling for their parents and that growth in parental potential
income zit makes child labor less valuable for them.
Education in childhood is the only means to acquire advanced skills in adulthood. The level of






where h(0; 0) = 1; limeit!1 h1(e
i












t )  0
and j; k = 1; 2. These properties have the following meanings. First, no education investment
24fj denotes the partial derivative of a function f with respect to the jth argument. This notation is applied in
what follows.
25For example, if l(eit; e
g
t ) = max(1  eit   egt ; 0); where  > 0; then e^(egt ) = max(1  egt ; 0): Thus, the set [0; e^t) in
(5) may be empty depending on egt :
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results in one unit of e¢ ciency labor. Second, the function is increasing and strictly concave with
respect to each input. Third, the marginal productivity of private education decreases with the
level of public education. These properties generate a substitutional relationship between private
and public education.
In what follows, it is further assumed that the marginal productivity of private education,









>  1 8egt 2 [0;  ]: (A1)
As will become clear, this condition assures that high-income parents do not use child labor re-
gardless of the degree of the child labor regulation.
3.3.3 Optimization
Adult individuals maximize their own utilities by taking market prices and public policies as given.
Substituting (6) into (3) and then the result and (7) into (4), an adult individual i in period t
chooses the number of children to bear, nit; and the level of private education, e
i
t; in such a way
that
fnit; eitg = argmax

(1  ) ln[T   nit( + eit   !(eit; egt ; zit))] +  ln[nith(eit; egt )]
	
; (8)
subject to T  nit( + eit) and eit  0: The rst inequality is the nonnegativity constraint on the
time for his/her labor market participation.
The objective function is strictly concave with respect to nit. The rst-order condition for an
interior solution reveals that the net cost of child-rearing is
nit( + e
i
t   !it) = T: (9)
The relationship between nit and e
i
t indicates that the individual faces a trade-o¤ between the
quantity and the quality of children. Equally important, an increase in the relative wage of child
labor, !it; induces him/her to have more children.
Given (9), the constraint for the labor market participation is unbinding for any eit  0 as long as
zit  w=[(1  )]  zmin: It should be emphasized that under this condition, the relative potential
income of child labor, w=zit, is lower than the xed cost of child-rearing, : That is, child-rearing is
more or less costly in net, and child labor income alone does not motivate parents to have children.
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In order to analyze the optimization with respect to eit, substitute (9) for n
i
t in (8). The solid




t) on the space e
i
t  0; for given
egt 2 [0;  ] and zit  zmin: The function exhibits strict concavity above the kinked point e^(egt ),




t) is just zero. The locally-optimal level e(e
g
t ) has the following
properties.
Lemma 1 Under (A1); the optimal value of eit on the interval [e^(e
g
t );1) is given by a single-valued
function e(egt ) such that e(e
g
t ) > e^(e
g
t ) and e
0(egt ) < 0 8egt 2 [0;  ]:
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
Thus, e(egt ) is the best choice among the levels of private education that do not allow child
labor. The lemma does not ensure the optimality of e(egt ) on R+ when the complementary set
[0; e^(egt )); where child labor is used, is non-empty (i.e., e^(e
g
t ) > 0). This situation is considered in
Figure 2, which graphically represents how private education is induced by growth in zit with e
g
t






t); decline on [0; e^(e
g
t ))
and accordingly the function V shifts downward on this interval. Thus, su¢ ciently large zit makes
the level e(egt ) optimal on R+: This is the rationale for the lemma below.
Lemma 2 If zit is su¢ ciently large under (A1); the function e(e
g
t ) yields the globally optimal level
of private education, eit; for each e
g
t 2 [0;  ]:
Proof. See Appendix 1. 
This result, along with Lemma 1, suggests that e(egt ) is the reaction function of private education
for high-income households. In response to a supply of public education, their optimal strategy is
to spend e(egt ) units of time per child on education, with no use of child labor.
On the other hand, optimization is more complicated for low-income households with small zit.
They may use child labor while investing in private education since a globally optimal solution may
emerge somewhere on [0; e^(egt )) in Figure 2.
26 In order to simplify the analysis in this situation,
suppose that there is an income-dependent discount factor by which the poor do not care about
26For example, consider the case with no public education provided (i.e. egt = 0). Equation (35) in Appendix 1
shows that if    w=zit is positive but su¢ ciently small, then V (0; 0; zit) > V (e(0); 0; zit), noting that e(0) > e^(0)  0:
In this case, no private education is at least more optimal than choosing e(0). However, eit = 0 may be sub-optimal




















8<: 0 for zit  z;1 for zit > z; (A2)
where z > zmin is a large value of parental potential income for which Lemma 2 holds.27 It follows




t+1)]: This rules out
the case in which children engage in both work and private education.
It follows that the optimal decision on private education is summarized as
eit =
8<: 0 if zit 2 [zmin; z];e(egt ) if zit > z; (10)
where e(egt ) > e^(e
g
t ) and e
0(egt ) < 0 8egt 2 [0;  ]: The properties of the function e(egt ) are graphically
represented by the lower-right panel of Figure 4. Under Assumption (A1), the solid curve eit = e(e
g
t )
lies outside the Child Labor Frontier on the range where egt 2 [0;  ]: This implies that choosing a level
e(egt ) for private education leaves no room for child labor, regardless of the degree of compulsory
schooling. Equally important, the positive slope of the curve indicates a substitutional relationship
between private and public education.28





 np(egt ; zit) if zit 2 [zmin; z];
T
+e(egt )
 nr(egt ) if zit > z;
(11)
where the e¤ect of public education on fertility changes qualitatively between the two cases. As
depicted by Figure 3, the function np(egt ; z
i
t); which yields the fertility rate for low-income house-
holds, is decreasing in egt : An increase in e
g
t reduces child labor, l
i
t = l(0; e
g
t ); and thus child labor




t. The resulting rise in the child-rearing cost induces fertility decline (upper left
panel).29 On the other hand, Figure 4 shows that the function nr(egt ); which yields the fertility rate
for high-income households, is increasing in egt : An increase in e
g
t reduces the household spending
27Assumption (A2) incorporates the insight of Fisher (1930, pp. 7374), who argues that poverty is likely to induce
impatience. Since the realization of the quantity of children precedes that of the quality, it appears plausible that
low-income households attach greater importance on the former.
28Recall that the unbinding child labor regulation is consistent with the words of Nardinelli (1990, p. 149), quoted
in Section 2.2. The second derivative of e(egt ) is generally ambiguous because it depends on the third derivatives of
the function h. See (36) in Appendix 1 for details.
29 e^g in Figure 3 is the minimum value of egt for which l(0; e
g
t ) = 0. Thus, for any e
g
t  e^g; no child labor is used,
and np(egt ; z
i
t) is constant at T=.
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on education, eit = e(e
g
t ), and promotes fertility through the quality-quantity trade-o¤ (upper left
panel). Public education in this case works as education subsidies or a child care service.
3.4 Demographic Structure and Technological Change










where the initial value N i0 > 0 is historically given. The entire size of the adult population in period
t; Nt; is the sum of Nat and N
b






t + (1  qt)nbt ; (12)






showing that qt decreases over time as long as group a is less fertile than group b:






t ) + (1  qt+1)h(ebt ; egt ): (14)
Thus, ht+1 is determined fully by private and public investment in education, eit and e
g
t respec-
tively, and the share of group a among children in period t, qt+1: Suppose that ht+1 fully governs
technological progress between periods t and t+ 1: That is,
gt+1  At+1  At
At
= g(ht+1); (15)
where g is a continuous function such that g(0) = 0 and g0(ht+1) > 0 8ht+1 > 0: This formulation
implies no depreciation in accumulated knowledge and that technological progress is driven by the
quality rather than the quantity of the population. The scale e¤ect of the population, argued by
Kuznets (1960) and Kremer (1993) among others, would be appropriate for analyzing the devel-
opment process in the pre-modern period, and its omission appears to be plausible for the periods
after the Industrial Revolution a focus of this paper.
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As follows from (14) and (15), the potential income of an adult individual i in period t + 1;
zit+1; is given by








t ; qt+1); (16)
where i; j = a; b and i 6= j. The function  incorporates the positive externalities of private and
public education on the growth rate of technology gt+1 as well as their direct impact on individual
human capital hit+1. The individual takes into account these two channels in forming his/her
attitude toward public education.
As shown below, endogenously introduced public education promotes technological progress
and thereby accelerates the decline in the marginal productivity of child relative to adult labor,
t = w=At, triggering the shift from the use of child labor to the education of children.
3.5 The Political System
3.5.1 Political Groups
The allocation of government resources in period t reects the preferences of three interest groups:
the young, divided into groups a and b; and the old.30 Their desirable levels of public education
are denoted as egat , e
gb
t ; and e
go
t ; respectively. The provided level of public education is determined
by a weighted average such that
egt = t[e
ga
t + (1  )egbt ] + (1  t)egot ; (17)
where t denotes the political power of the young in period t, and  2 (0; 1) indicates the political
power of group a in the adult generation. Once determined, the level of public education egt is
enforceable on any children in period t.
Along the line with the discussions in Sections 12, t is assumed to increase with the fraction
of the young to the old population in period t; nt 1. This is formulated by a function such that
t = (nt 1); (18)
where 0(nt 1) > 0 8nt 1 > 0; limnt 1!0+ (nt 1) = 0 and limnt 1!1 (nt 1) = 1. In light of
Pampel (1994) mentioned in Section 2.3, the quantitative properties of the function  would depend
30 In what follows, adult individuals are sometimes referred to as young householdsor the young.Despite the
economic structure with three overlapping generations, this way of bipolarization makes sense because individuals in
childhood make neither economic nor political decisions.
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on country-dependent institutional conditions such as the degrees of corporatism and leftist parties.
This point will be taken up later in Section 5.
Furthermore,  is limited on the range
0 <  < min(e^g= ; 1); (19)
where e^g is, as shown by Figure 3, the critical level of public education above which no room is left
for the poor to use child labor; i.e., l(0; egt ) = 0 if and only if e
g
t  e^g: The restriction on  indicates
some degree of political inuence exerted by the poorer group b: The rationale for this postulation
comes from the possibility that the strict enforcement of compulsory schooling provokes either
boycotts or riots by the poor. Faced with these fears, group a nds better to make a compromise
between child labor and child education so as to promote universal education. This way of political
process appears to be consistent with the historical evidence presented in Section 2.1. In Japan,
early education reforms were sometimes accompanied by riots against compulsory schooling. In
Western Europe, the opposition from the poor was behind the half-time system in education. Most
of those escapees or opponents, who needed child labor rather than child education, were not
enfranchised in the era of the early education reforms.31 On the basis of these facts, the political
power of group b is assumed to be e¤ective regardless of their voting status.
3.5.2 IndividualsPolicy Preferences
Adult individuals in period t choose their preferred education policy so as to maximize the utility
specied by (4) and (A2). They take into account the e¤ects of public policies on market prices,
so that the wage rate wt+1(= At+1) as well as the discount factor it is added to (8). Therefore, it
follows from (16) that
egit = argmax
n
(1  ) ln[T   nit( + eit   !(eit; egit ; zit))] + (zit) ln (eit; egit ; ejt ; qt+1)
o
; (20)
subject to egit 2 [0;  ]: The function  incorporates the positive externality of public education on the
wage rate wt+1 as well as their direct impact on individual human capital hit+1: It is assumed that
those parents can choose the level of private education after the provided level of public education
31As for Japan in 1902, the enfranchised people, who had to pay some amount of taxes, accounted for only 2.2% of
the entire population (Soma, 1986, p. 31). In Western Europe, the franchise extended towards the turn of the 19th
century (Flora et al., 1983, Ch. 3).
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egt is revealed. By contrast, they must decide the number of children in advance, according to (11),
with perfect foresight into egt .
32
Next, turn to the policy preferences of old individuals in period t. Substituting (2) into (4),
their desirable level of public education is,
egot = argmax fmin[(   egot )nt 1; ]g
subject to egot 2 [0;  ]: Hence, there exists a critical level of public education, ~egt  0, below which








The aged group, when indi¤erent, is assumed to accept the policy proposed by the young. Thus,
~egt is the maximum amount of public education budgets acceptable for the old and, in view of (17),
egot = min
n
egat + (1  )egbt ; ~egt
o
: (22)
Since ~egt is a nondecreasing function of nt 1; equation (22) shows that the higher the number
of taxpayers per aged person, the more generous the old tend to be toward education policy.
Furthermore, since ~eg(nt 1) <  8nt 1 > 0; the old always claim a certain amount of public
resources to enjoy their own consumption.
4 The Process of Industrialization
This section demonstrates that the described economy undergoes the process of industrialization
consistent with the evidence in Sections 12. In particular, the underlying evolution of public
education and fertility is depicted in Figure 5 and is basically consistent with the historical records
in Table 1.33
Suppose that in period 0, adult individuals of group a are endowed with non-basic skills such
that ha0 > h
b
0 = 1; where h
a




t ) on the interval [0;  ]: The economy
starts out with a share of group a in the adult generation and a level of technology such that
q0 2 (0; "); A0 2 (Amin; z); (A3)
32As will be discussed later in Footnote 34, the timing of childbirth changes the reason for the young poor to oppose
child labor regulations and compulsory education.
33The ratio egt = = e
g
tNt=Nt in Figure 5 corresponds to E=G in Table 1 (i.e., the share of public education in
total government expenditure).
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where " > 0 is a su¢ ciently small value, and Amin  max(zmin; z=ha0): Then it follows that
za0 > z
 > zb0, where zit = Athit: This initial income inequality, along with (10) and (15), reveals
that
zat  max(z; zbt ) > zmin 8t  0; (23)
where zat > z
. Thus, children of group a never work and, instead, engage in skill-acquisition in any
period. Furthermore, adult individuals in any period devote a positive time fraction in the labor
market (i.e., no complete specialization in child-rearing).
Under these circumstances, the process of industrialization is divided into two stages, between
which group b, majority of the young, alters its child-rearing strategies. In Stage I (zbt  z), public
education is undesired by members of group b; who need child labor to secure current consumption.
The enforcement of compulsory schooling regulates child labor to some extent and also promotes
technological progress that reduces the relative productivity of child to adult labor. These two
forces together adversely a¤ect the return on child labor and thus discourage average fertility. The
accelerated technological progress expedites the departure from Stage I.
In Stage II (zbt > z
), public education is desired by all young households, who are wealthy
enough to abandon child labor. Their positive attitudes toward human capital investment bring
about a major education reform and fertility decline an event corresponding to the change in egt =
and nt between periods t   1 and t in Figure 5. The increased share of the elderly population,
however, squeezes the ow of government resources to education. To make up for the reduced
public support, young households spend more on private education by having fewer children. This
process leads to a vicious cycle of population aging and a decline in public education, through
which growth performance may be deteriorated.
4.1 Stage I: Public Education as a Duty
The economy develops in Stage I on the time interval [0; t); where t is the critical period in which
zbt exceeds z
 for the rst time. That is, in view of (23),
zat > z
  zbt > zmin 8t 2 [0; t): (24)
As shown below, in this circumstance, compulsory schooling works as a child labor regulation that
reduces consumption of the low-income group b and thereby discourages childbirth. The poors
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negative stance toward education reform leads to a half-time system that allows child labor to
some extent.
4.1.1 Private Education, Child Labor, and Policy Preferences
Since (A2) reveals that in this stage at = 1 > 
b
t = 0 8egt  0; only adult individuals of group a
have an incentive to invest in child education. Furthermore, it follows from (5) and (10) that the
chosen levels of private education and child labor are, 8egt 2 [0;  ];
eat = e(e
g
t ) > e
b
t = 0;
lbt = l(0; e
g
t )  lat = l(e(egt ); egt ) = 0:
(25)
Thus, adult individuals of group a adjust spending on private education in response to the gov-
ernment subsidies for education. They do not send their children to work regardless of child labor
regulation. Since zat is greater than z
 in this stage, sending their children to work, rather than to
school, does not compensate for their future loss in human capital. By contrast, the low-income
group b cannot a¤ord education and rely on child labor income.
Therefore, it follows from (20) that their desirable levels of public education are






t ; qt+1) =  ;
egbt = argmax
n
T   nbt [   !(0; egbt ; zbt )]
o
= 0:
The asymmetric stances above indicate the existence of between-group conict (class conict) over
education policy; public service for education is desired by adult members of group a. It raises the
future potential income of their children wt+1hat+1 with no harm because the child labor regulation
is not binding for them. By contrast, this is not the case for adult members of group b, who care
only about current consumption and the quantity of their children, nbt : Since n
b
t is determined
in advance, a rise in egt merely diminishes their child labor income !
b
t and current consumption
cbt = z
b
t [T  nbt( !bt)] with no positive welfare e¤ect. This is the lock-in e¤ect of fertility decisions,
emphasized by Deopke and Zilibotti (2005), prompts the unwealthy group to oppose compulsory
education.34
34The reason for their opposition changes depending on the timing of childbirth. If parents choose nbt after the
education policy for period t was determined, nbt is adjusted so that (9) holds. Then, it follows that consumption is
cbt = (1   )Tzbt regardless of the implemented education policy. In this case, it is the adverse e¤ect on childbirth,
rather than on consumption, that induces the opposition of group b against compulsory education.
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4.1.2 The Evolution of Average Fertility and Public Education
Conditional Dynamics Equations (17), (18), and (22) reveal that, in the presence of the afore-
mentioned between-group conict, the provided level of public education in period t + 1(< t)
is
egt+1 = (nt) + [1  (nt)]min[ ; ~eg(nt)]  eg(nt; ); (26)
where  is viewed as the representative policy preference of the young. This indicates that whether
the elderly accept the education level  or not depends on nt, which becomes the number of adult
individuals (taxpayers) per aged person in period t+ 1. As depicted by Figure 6, eg(nt; ) is con-
stant at  as long as nt is above a certain level, below which the function is strictly monotonically
decreasing towards the origin.
It follows from (11), (12), and (24) that average fertility in Stage I is,
nt = qtn
r(egt ) + (1  qt)np(egt ; zbt ); (27)
where, as shown by Figures 34, a rise in egt has two opposing forces. While it promotes the fertility
of group a by subsidizing private education, it decreases the fertility of group b by regulating child
labor. The former positive e¤ect is negligible if the share of group a in the adult population, qt; is
su¢ ciently small (i.e., if child labor is needed by most young households). On the other hand, the
latter negative e¤ect completely dissipates for any egt 2 (e^g;1); where the complete regulation on
child labor reduces nbt to a minimum level T= (cf. Footnote 29). Therefore, given a su¢ ciently
small qt, average fertility in (27) decreases with small e
g
t a situation depicted in Figure 6.
Based on those results, Figure 6 represents the evolution of average fertility and education
policy in Stage I for a given pair q 2 (0; ") and zb 2 (zmin; z]. The average number of children per
adult in period t; nt, determines public support for education in the subsequent period, e
g
t+1; which
in turn a¤ects average fertility in the same period, nt+1: Thus, the intersection of the two solid
curves generates a conditional steady-state equilibrium, in which nt+1 = nt: The arrows indicate
that nt nonmonotonically converges to the steady-state level. However, the stability is not always
the case because the slopes of the two curves are generally ambiguous in their degrees. The central
result here is that the limited but positive supply of public education lowers the growth path of nt
(compared with the case in which egt is xed at zero) while keeping nt above T=:
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Unconditional Dynamics Assumption (A3) and historically-determined factors yield the initial




0 ; q0; A0), where N
o
0 > 0 is the population size of the old generation in period 0:








t ; Nt; qt; At) fully determines the counterpart for the subsequent period
(i.e., forward-looking solutions). Given the pair (egt ; z
i
t); each young household makes the optimal
decision on fertility nit, private education e
i
t, and thus h
i
t+1: These choices, along with Nt and qt;
determine (nt; Nt+1; qt+1; gt+1); noting (12)(15). These outcomes in turn yield parental potential
income zit+1  At+1hit+1 and the level of public education egt+1 = eg(nt; ):
Equation (27) implies that in Stage I, the fertility rate of group a is less than the average as
long as qt 2 (0; 1). Then, it follows from (13) and q0 < " from (A3) that
0 < qt+1 < qt 8t 2 [0; t); (28)
indicating the growing share of group b in the adult population. Accordingly, qt remains on a
small interval (0; ") for all t 2 [0; t]; implying that average fertility and human capital are a¤ected
signicantly by the behaviors of the majority group b:35
Then, (26) and (27) reveal that, 8t 2 [0; t);




The limited supply of public education, along with (19) and (25), yields lbt = l(0; e
g
t ) > 0 and
hbt+1 = h(0; e
g
t ) > 1, permitting children of group b to engage in both work and skill acquisition.
This situation, caused by the poors negative pressure on public education, corresponds to the half-
time system mentioned in Section 2.1. The partial enforcement of universal schooling enhances
average human capital and thereby advances technological progress. This is the intuition of the
proposition below.
Proposition 1 Under (A1)(A3); compulsory schooling enforced over Stage I raises the growth
rates of technology and lowers the growth path of average fertility in the stage, compared to the case
with no public education.
35More precisely, " is dened as a small value such that, for any egt 2 [0;  ] and zbt 2 (zmin; z]; (a) a weighted
average of human capital "h(e(egt ); e
g
t ) + (1   ")h(0; egt ) increases with egt and (b) that of fertility "nr(egt ) + (1  
")np(egt ; z
b
t ) decreases with e
g
t and is greater than T=: The condition (a) is necessary because, due to the negative




t ): Such an indirect adverse e¤ect is
negligible as long as " is su¢ ciently small.
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Proof. As follows from (28), (29), and Footnote 35, public education enforced in period t 2 [0; t)
enhances average human capital ht+1 in (14) for a given qt+1: In view of (13) and (27), it also reduces
average fertility nt and raises the share of group a in the adult generation qt+1 (compared to the
case with egt = 0). Since, as implied by (25) and (27), group a has a higher level of private education
and a lower fertility rate than those of group b; the rise in qt+1 has a positive and a negative impact
on ht+1 and nt+1; respectively. These results along with (15) establish the proposition. 
Therefore, the enforcement of compulsory education expedites the departure from Stage I, by
promoting growth in potential income of group b; zbt = Ath(0; e
g
t ). Note that the evolution of
average fertility nt is under the inuence of two opposing dynamic forces. On the one hand, growth
in zbt reduces n
b
t by making child labor less and less productive than adult labor. On the other
hand, as shown by (28), the more fertile group b increases its population share 1   qt over time.
Since qt in Stage I is bounded by a small value ", however, average fertility is likely to exhibit a
decreasing trend over time. When nt and thus e
g





may be nonmonotonic as well.
4.2 Stage II: Public Education as a Right
In Stage II, which begins in period t; investment in human capital becomes advantageous for all
young households, a change that induces decisive fertility decline. While they unanimously support
extensive education policy, the elderly, who prefer the other public service, gradually expand their
population share and political inuence. Their negative pressure on public education raises the cost
of private education and thereby discourages fertility. This leads to a vicious cycle of population
aging and a decline in public education.
4.2.1 Private Education, Child Labor, and Policy Preferences
Consider a period in which the relationship (zat ; z
b
t )  z holds as in period t: Then, (A2) shows
that at = 
b
t = 1 for any e
g
t  0; implying the incentive to care about the future incomes of their
children. Furthermore, it follows from (5) and (10) that for any egt 2 [0;  ];
eit = e(e
g







t ) = 0:
(30)
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That is, parents uniformly decide how much to invest privately in education, depending on the
government support for education. Furthermore, the chosen level of private education does not
allow child labor regardless of the regulation on it.36 This is because, in view of (A2), zit exceeding
z su¢ ciently reduces the values of child labor (in terms of parental time), !it:
Substituting these results into (20), the desirable level of public education for an adult individual
i is






t ; qt+1) =  : (31)
Thus, public education is now viewed as a desirable service for all adult individuals, and no political
conict arises among them. Since child labor regulation is no longer binding for any household,
compulsory education is, given nit; expected to promote the future potential income of children
wt+1h
i




t[T   nit( + eit)]:
Since, as shown above, households are identical with respect to child-rearing, the resulting levels




 8t  t:
That is, after period t; there is no income inequality between the two young groups, and the retreat
to Stage I (zbt  z) does not occur. Accordingly (30)(31) hold for any t  t:
4.2.2 The Evolution of Average Fertility and Public Education
The increased demand for public education encounters opposition from the elderly, who more or less
need the other service xt: This is implied by (21), in which the desirable level of public education
for the young,  , inevitably exceeds the acceptable level for the elderly, ~egt . Thus, in light of (26),
the level of public education in period t+ 1( t) is given by a single-valued function such that
egt+1 = e
g(nt; ) = (nt) + [1  (nt)]~eg(nt); (32)
where limnt!0 eg(nt; ) = 0 and limnt!1 eg(nt; ) =  : Note that a decline in nt (the ratio of the
adult to old population) strictly monotonically decreases eg(nt; ) through two channels, (nt) and
36Recall that the unbinding child labor regulation is consistent with the words of Nardinelli (1990, p. 149), quoted
in Section 2.2.




t ) > z
 for any egt 2 [0;  ] and
At+1  A0: That is, the potential income of an adult individual i; zit+1; is greater than z whenever the individual
receives private education in period t.
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~eg(nt). First, it weakens the relative political power of adult individuals, who claim  units of
public education. Second, since it implies a decline in the number of taxpayers per aged person,
more budgets tend to be necessary for the elderly to be saturated at xt+1 = :
Equation (11) reveals that in Stage II, there is no between-group di¤erence in fertility rates
(nat = n
b




 + e(egt )
; (33)
where nr(egt ) < T= and n
r0(egt ) > 0 8egt 2 [0;  ], as shown by Figure 4. Thus, recalling (29),
the levels of average fertility in this stage are lower than those in Stage I. This reects the shift of
group b from the use of child labor to the education of children. Furthermore, the positive e¤ect
on fertility of public education arises from its substitutional relationship with private education.
Based on those properties, Figure 7 depicts the evolution of average fertility and public ed-
ucation. The arrows reveal that a value nt determines the education policy in the subsequent
period, egt+1 = e
g(nt; ); and then the average number of children per adult, nt+1 = nr(e
g
t+1):
Given the initial value nt 1 > T= from (29), nt and e
g
t monotonically decline towards a non-
trivial stationary-state equilibrium, which occurs on the intersection of the two solid curves.38 The
equilibrium is characterized by the positive levels of average fertility and of public education.
The analysis here rules out the possibility that public education goes back to a level in Stage I.
For that purpose, suppose that
eg(nr(0); )   ; (A4)
where  is, as shown by (29), the upper limit of public education in Stage I.39 Since eg(nt; ) is
strictly increasing in nt; the gure shows that e
g
t >  8t  t. These results establish the following
key proposition.
Proposition 2 Under (A1)(A4);






t 8t  t;
(b) nt converges to a nontrivial stationary-state equilibrium where nt = nr(eg(nt; )):
38The derived properties of nr(egt ) and e
g(nt; ) do not ensure the uniqueness of the steady-state equilibrium. In
the case of multiple equilibria, nt converges to the largest steady-state level, which exists on (0; T=):
39 In view of (21) and (32), this assumption is satised if, for instance, the selshness parameter of the old, , is
su¢ ciently small and the political power of the young, (nt); is su¢ ciently large for nt = nr(0):
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Proposition 2(a) asserts a monotonic fertility decline and a rise and fall of public education on
the time interval [t   1;1): In particular, the initial fertility decline from nt 1 to nt as opposed
to the rise in public education from egt 1 to e
g
t is consistent with the historical evidence in Table
1. This asymmetry reects the shift in child rearing strategies of group b, from the use of child
labor to the education of children. The key assumption here is the restriction on q0 in (A3): Under
the condition, group b maintains a su¢ ciently large share in the adult population over Stage I.
The proposition also suggests the subsequent decline in average fertility and in public education.
The underlying mechanism is found in a cyclical interaction between them. As a result of a
fertility decline, the old generation expands its population share and becomes more inuential in
the intergenerational allocation of government resources. The resulting squeeze on the budget for
public education imposes higher education costs on the young, and thereby discourages childbirth.
As will become apparent, the diminishing public investment in education may retard technological
progress and growth in output per worker.
A few remarks deserve special attention at this point. First, Proposition 2 does not indicate a
nominal decline in public education expenditures, as egt is measured in the time of adult workers.
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Second, a reduction in egt necessitates larger household spending on education because, in this stage,
human capital investment is benecial for the young. Such a substitutional relationship between
private and public education is not observed in Stage I and, hence, the downward spiral of fertility
and public education is the phenomenon peculiar to Stage II. Third and nally, the steady-state
levels of fertility and public education depend on the degrees of social and political factors such
as selshness of the old, their political power in a given age structure, and the subsidiary e¤ect of
public education on private education. These are reected in the level of  and the quantitative
properties of the functions  and e; respectively.
Figure 8 shows the dynamic e¤ects of exogenously augmenting the subsidiary e¤ect of public
education. This improvement lightens nancial burdens of private education for each egt > 0; thus
shifting the fertility curve nt = nr(e
g
t ) rightward. As a result, the economy in the lower steady-
40As dened in Section 3.2, egt denotes public education expenditure per child-rearing household in period t:
Although per-child expenditure appears to be plausible for the level of public education, using this alternative
measure would not change the main results qualitatively. In such a case, (33) is replaced with nt = nr(e
g
t =nt); where
egt =nt is the time of public education allocated to each child. Since the right hand side of the equation is decreasing in
nt; it implies a one-to-one, positive relationship between nt and e
g
t : Thus, the dynamical system becomes essentially
the same as the one in Figure 7, and nt; e
g
t ; and e
g
t =nt decrease over Stage II.
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state equilibrium converges toward the new one through an upward spiral between nt and e
g
t :What
causes this structural change? As shown by (36) in Appendix 1, e0(egt ) depends on properties of the





t ), and (b) how much e
g




t ). In reality, these would
be associated with how to allocate the public education budget among various opportunities that
foster individual human capital. If the budget egt is used intensively for the instruction of particular
skills, for instance, high returns to investment in other skills would be left to households. This
could undermine the subsidiary e¤ect of public education and thus induce relatively low fertility.
Therefore, the focus of public education is a potential factor for the cross-country variations in the
speed of population aging and the decline in public education.
4.2.3 Economic Growth Slowdown
As formulated by (15), the growth rate of technology, gt+1; has a monotonic relationship with the





t ) 8t  t; (34)
where the e¤ect of public education is generally ambiguous. In addition to its direct positive
e¤ect, a rise in egt adversely a¤ects individual human capital by discouraging private education.
Therefore, a decline in egt deteriorates growth performance of the economy as long as the direct
e¤ect is dominant.
Proposition 3 Under (A1)(A4); the decline in public education lowers the growth rate of tech-
nology and that of parental potential income over Stage II, unless the positive response of private
education, e0(egt ); is signicant.
As discussed above, the slope of e(egt ) depends on the quantitative properties of the production
function of human capital, h. For instance, if public education has a limited impact on the marginal
productivity of private education (i.e., the cross derivative h12(eit; e
g
t ) is su¢ ciently small in absolute
value), these two types of education have a weak substitutability with each other. Under this
circumstance, it is likely that the decline in public education over Stage II stimulates private
education insu¢ ciently, leading to lower average human capital and delayed technological progress.
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5 Discussions of the Model
This section considers the workings of the basic assumptions adopted in the model and examines
how the main results are a¤ected by relaxing them. Furthermore, it shows that extending the basic
model yields notable insights for the development of education reforms and the speed of fertility
decline.
5.1 Basic Assumptions
Assumptions (A1) and (A2) together generate parentsdiscrete choice between private education
and child labor in any situation. Namely, there is no such case that working children receive private
(rather than public) education. This substantially simplies their policy preferences and facilitates
the dynamic analysis. Without (A1), many children may work even in developed stages a case
not supported by historical evidence (cf. Section 2.2). As for (A2), if the weight parameter on the
quality of children, it, is either stationary or a continuous increasing function of z
i
t; the desirable
level of public education for group b; egbt ; might rise from zero in Stage I. This permits a gradual
development of public schooling in Stage I a more realistic result yet at the cost of exposition.
The initial conditions in Assumption (A3) play a crucial role for the described scenario of
industrialization. First, the share of group a (higher income class) in the adult generation, q0; is
limited so that average human capital and fertility in Stage I primarily reect the child-rearing
strategies of the poorer group b. This excludes the possibility that average human capital decreases
in Stage I (cf. Footnote 35) and also makes nt 1 greater than T= so that average fertility declines
between periods t   1 and t.
Second, the restriction on the technology level ensures that the economy starts out with Stage
I, where child education is a burden only for group b: As mentioned in Footnote 37, it also ensures
that those who received private education in their childhood obtain potential income zit+1 greater
than z: Even if this condition is violated, technological progress eventually keeps zit+1 above z
regardless of the skill level, and thus Propositions 23 hold in the end.
5.2 Omitted Elements
The model abstracts from various elements primarily for tractability. It is expected that they a¤ect
the political system, given by (17), not only through the policy preferences of the three groups
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represented by egat ; e
gb
t ; and e
go
t but also through their political powers weighted by t and . In
general, both the function  and the parameter  would depend on the degree of the eagerness for
(or aversion to) public education, as it motivates the establishment of political institutions including
nonprot organizations and unions, which foster corporatism among individuals sharing the same
interests (cf. Section 2.3).
5.2.1 Inequality
The relative political power of group a in the adult population, represented by ; should vary with
some endogenous variables such as the ratio of group a in the adult population, qt; and the level
of parental potential income of group b; zbt : This is because poorer households will have a stronger
incentive to combat against compulsory education, so as to secure subsistence consumption by
utilizing child labor. According to the dynamic analysis above, qt decreases and zbt grows (not
necessarily monotonically though) in Stage I. These changes would reduce  and thus the provision
of public education in this stage. On the other hand, as just mentioned in relation to Assumption
(A2), there is a potential wealth e¤ect that induces group bs desire for public education in Stage I.
The former negative force would be dominant in the early phases of industrialization if both q0 and
zb0 are su¢ ciently small (i.e., high degree of between-group inequality in period 0). Therefore, the
theory predicts the delaying e¤ect of inequality on the extension of public education and fertility
decline.
5.2.2 Factor Markets
The evolution of the economy would be under the inuence of omitted production factors physical
capital and agricultural land in the presence of international trade and pecuniary externalities.41
To begin with, suppose that the nal good can be either consumed or stored as capital that can
be rented out to producers in the subsequent period. Members of group a would save a fraction
of their incomes for consumption in their old age. Equally important, the interest rate increases
with the aggregate stock of human capital, provided that the modied production function exhibits
complementarity between physical and human capital. Such a pecuniary externality would reinforce
their desire for universal education, whereas the positive interest accrued to the old would moderate
41The discussions in the rst two paragraphs are along the line of Galor (2005).
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their opposition (compared with the case in the basic model). These e¤ects would translate into
larger values of  and ~egt ; promoting public education over Stage I at the cost of fertility.
42
In contrast to capitalists, landowners would seek to block education reforms. Suppose that the
economy has another production sector, which employs agricultural land and raw labor (either child
or uneducated adult labor). Due to the lack of complementarity between land and skills, imposing
compulsory education would erode the productivity of land by absorbing labor supply in agriculture.
Under these circumstances, several economic factors promoting agricultural prots, such as land
abundance/inequality and international trade, would spur the landed class into opposition against
public schooling. Provided that landownership is under the old generation, their rent-seeking
activities would have downward pressure on the relative political power of the young, t. This
leads to the delay in education reforms and fertility decline.
A potential pecuniary externality exists in the labor markets as well. In the basic model,
the relative supply of child labor has no impact on the wage rate of adult labor because, given
the production function in (1), there is no substitutability between them.43 In the presence of
substitutability, labor market participation by children is expected to undermine the demand for
adult labor.44 This adverse e¤ect would be relatively minor in the early stages of industrialization,
where the wage discrepancy between child and adult labor is small; the earnings of children would
be more important from the viewpoint of the poor. In the process of industrialization, however, the
expansion of the wage discrepancy would intensify the adverse e¤ect and accelerate the reversal of
group bs policy preferences. Furthermore, it motivates group as desire for child labor regulations
because they do not use child labor in any case. These foster the development of public schooling.
5.2.3 Preferences
As formulated by (4), parents in the described economy do not derive utility from the leisure of
children. Relaxing this assumption would alter their child-rearing quantitatively. That is, low-
and high-income households would reduce child labor and private education, respectively, in order
to allow their children some amount of leisure. As a result, the curve lit = l(0; e
g
t ) in Figure 3
42As shown by (22), ~egt is the maximum level of public education acceptable to the old generation.
43Nardinelli (1990, pp. 131143) provides some historical examples in which adult workers did not perceive child
workers as their competitors. For example, in mid-19th century France, where the family labor system was pervasive
in both agriculture and industry, child labor legislation did not gain support from the working class (p. 137).
44Deopke and Zilibotti (2005) argue that the labor market participation of child labor erodes the wage rate of
unskilled labor. For a general model of pecuniary externalities across occupations, see Mookherjee and Ray (2003).
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shifts toward the origin, leading to the decline in child labor income !t and in the fertility of the
poor. Although the curve eit = e(e
g
t ) in Figure 4 shifts to the same direction, the resulting impact
on fertility is opposite, as the lighter expenditure for private education allows the rich to have
more children. Hence, as depicted by Figure 8, the fertility curve swings rightward. The levels of
fertility and public education would be higher in the new steady-state equilibrium, noting that the
relaxation is unlikely to a¤ect the youngs demand for public education.45
The parameter , denoting the degree of the selshness of the old generation, would depend
on whether the elderly live with their o¤springs. For example, in Japan, only in a decade from
1995 did the proportion of old people living alone in all the households rise from 17.2% to 22.5%
(Statistic Bureau, Ministry of Internal A¤airs and Communications, 2008, p. 68). Such a change
in family structure would weaken intergenerational ties within dynasties and raise  over Stage II.
The resulting downward shift in the curve egt+1 = e
g(nt; ) leads economies to lower steady-state
levels of average fertility and public education.
6 Concluding Remarks
This research has advanced the following thesis about the role of public education in the indus-
trialization process experienced by advanced economies: Mandatory education, embodied in early
factory legislation, promoted industrialization accompanied with the decline in child labor. The
subsequent shift in the young majoritys attitude to public education, from a duty to a right, paved
the way for major education reforms, yet then leading to a vicious cycle of fertility decline, popu-
lation aging and negative pressure on public education. The diminishing government support for
human capital investment was and will be a potential obstacle to economic growth in this century.
In order to avoid falling deeply into this spiral, advanced economies need to tackle some policy
issues. First, the budget for public education should be used to e¢ ciently lighten nancial burdens
of education on households. In other words, public education needs to be an e¤ective substitute
for private education. This is the channel through which the governments can keep relatively high
fertility. Note that in reality, this subsidiary e¤ect could be undermined by an improper education
policy. If public schools focus intensively on the acquisition of particular skills, for instance, high
45Recall that, as shown by (31), the desirable level of public education for the young,  ; is a corner solution because
public schooling in Stage II benets them with no harm in the basic model. Therefore, unless the leisure of children
is highly important for their parents, the demand for public education would be unchanged.
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returns to investment in other skills would be left to households. This might necessitate their large
spending on education at the cost of fertility, accelerating the aforementioned cyclical process.
Second, the generational conict over government resources should be mitigated to prevent
a disproportionate budget allocation to current consumption. Although one of the solutions is
to foster intergenerational altruism (represented by the inverse of  in the model), it will take a
long time to be e¤ective. Perhaps a more practical, fast-working remedy is to design incentive-
based mechanisms that benet all groups concerned. The key point here is how to motivate social
contributions by beneciaries of public services, and examples would include university fellowships
for students looking after old people. Further explorations in this issue are left for future research.
The nal remark is directed at the implications for comparative economic development. The
proposed theory demonstrates the development of public schooling and the accompanying fertility
decline observed in the modern period. This dynamic process is shaped by various elements omitted
in the described economy. In particular, the process would be promoted by complementarity
between physical and human capital or substitutability between adult and child labor. On the
other hand, it would be delayed by a high degree of inequality or a low degree of complementarity
between agricultural land and human capital. Since their quantitative impacts depend on country-
specic nature such as the levels and distributions of those production factors and the access to
international trade, a deeper theoretical and empirical research in these aspects would provide
additional insights for the observed variations in the evolution of public education and the speed
of population aging across countries.
Appendix 1 Technical Discussions
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting (9) into the objective function (8) yields
    ln[ + eit   !(eit; egt ; zit)] +  lnh(eit; egt )  V (eit; egt ; zit); (35)




















t )  h1(eit; egt )( + eit)   h(eit; egt ): Given the conditions of h in (7), G(eit; egt ) exhibits









t ) < 0;
where the inequality is because 8(eit; egt )  0; the term [h1(eit; egt )eit   h(eit; egt )] is negative (by




t ) > 0 8egt 2 [0;  ]: Therefore,
the Implicit Function Theorem reveals that there exists a single-valued function e(egt ) such that
8egt 2 [0;  ]; G(e(egt ); egt ) = 0; where e(egt ) > e^(egt ); and












where each function is evaluated at eit = e(e
g




t ) is the optimal solution on
[e^(egt );1); as the function V is strictly concave for all eit > e^(egt ) and is continuous at eit = e^(egt ): 



















where the inequality is shown above. This result and Lemma 1 reveal that for each egt 2 [0;  ],




t ) is the optimal solution on R+. Hence, the
lemma follows. 
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Appendix 2 Data Sources for Table 1
Variable Coverage Source
Japan
E=G 18901920 Ministry of Education, etc. (1971, Table 15, p. 39).
19602005 Ministry of Education, etc. (2007, p. 33).
B All NIPSSR (2008, Table 3.1, p. 17).
65+ All NIPSSR (2008, Table 2.6, p. 14).
United States
E=G All Carter et al. (2006, Vol. 5, Ea61, Ea64, and Ea67, p. 19).
B All Carter et al. (2006, Vol. 1, Ab40, pp. 399401).
65+ All Carter et al. (2006, Vol. 1, Aa125, and Aa139, pp. 4447).
Britain
E=G 18411971 Mitchell (1988, Public Finance 4on pp. 587595, Public Finance 12on pp. 612618,
Public Finance 15on pp. 626629, and Public Finance 18on pp. 638640).
1999 OECD (2002, Table B3.1, p. 178).
B All Mitchell (2007, Table A6, pp. 94120).
65+ 18411971 Mitchell (1988, Population and Vital Statistics 4,p. 15).
1999 Mitchell (2007, Table A2, pp. 1248).
France
E=G 18521975 Flora et al. (1983, Central Government Expenditures,pp. 381382).
2001
Calculated as (AB + CD)=F , where A = Public expenditure on primary,
secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education as percentage of GDP;
B = Proportion of central government expenditure to public expenditure on
primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education; C = Public
expenditure on tertiary education as percentage of GDP; D = Proportion of
central government expenditure to public expenditure on tertiary education
(OECD, 2004, Table B4.1 on p. 249 and Tables 4.2a4.2b available only
online at www.oecd.org/edu/eag2004); F = Central government expendi-
ture as percentage of GDP (Statistical O¢ ce of the European Communities,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/).
B All Mitchell (2007, Table A6, pp. 94120).
65+ All Mitchell (2007, Table A2, pp. 1248).
Germany
E=G 18721970 Flora et al. (1983, General Government Expenditures,pp. 391392).
2001 OECD (2004, Table B4.1, p. 249).
B All Mitchell (2007, Table A6, pp. 94120).
60+ All Mitchell (2007, Table A2, pp. 1248).
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Figure 1. Education, Fertility, and Industrialization
Notes: The ow chart illustrates the transition to a vicious cycle of population aging and a decline
in public education. In the early phases of industrialization, compulsory schooling regulated child
labor and promoted technological progress, thereby discouraging fertility. A major education reform
was eventually triggered by the rise in the youngs demand for skill acquisition. However, the
increased population share of the old enlarged their political power to curtail the government
budget for education. The resulting positive response of private education induced further fertility
decline.
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Table 1. Public Education, Birth Rates, and the Elderly Share
Japan United States United Kingdom
E=G B 65+ E=Gb B 65+ E=G Bc 65+
1890 8.0 28.7 5.5a 1902 17.2 32.3 4.1 1841 0.5 32.3 4.4
1920 12.3 36.2 5.3 1948 17.4 24.9 7.9 1881 5.6 33.9 4.6
1960 21.2 17.3 5.7 1970 21.7 18.4 9.8 1911 15.8 24.3 5.2
1980 19.7 13.5 9.1 1980 17.5 15.9 11,2 1971 13.9 15.9 13.3
2005 15.6 8.4 20.2 1995 16.0 14.8 12.7 1999 11.8 12.9 15.6
France Germany
E=Gd B 65+ E=G B 60+
1852 2.5 26.8 6.5e 1872 10.8 39.4 7.7g
1906 8.6 20.5 8.1 1891 17.4 40.1 8.0h
1954 9.1 18.7 11.4 1910 19.8 29.8 7.9
1975 25.3 14.1 14.3 1970f 15.1 13.4 19.3
2001 20.8 13.0 16.1 2001 9.7 8.9 23.7
Notes: E=G = Public expenditure on education as percentage of total public expenditure. B =
Crude birth rate per 1000. 65(60)+ = Number of population aged 65(60) and over as percentage of
total population. aYear of reference 1888; bExcluding expenditure on military service; cIncluding
only England and Wales; dIncluding only central government expenditure; eYear of reference 1851;
fIncluding only West Germany; gYear of reference 1871; hYear of reference 1890.
Sources: See Appendix 2.
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United Kingdom 8.5 20.0
United States 25.0a 32.7
OECD average 13.4a 14.5
Notes: Public subsidies are included. aYear of reference 1998.
Sources: OECD (2001, Table B3.1, p. 93; 2008, Table B3.1, p. 251).
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Figure 2. The Decision of Private Education (it = 1)
Notes: The diagram shows the choice of private education eit by an adult individual who cares
about the quality of his/her children. e(egt ) is the unique value that is optimal on [e^(e
g
t );1); where
the children do not work. Whether eit = e(e
g
t ) is preferred to any e
i
t 2 [0; e^(egt )) depends on the level
of child labor income !it  wl(eit; egt )=zit in the range. As the downward arrow indicates, growth in
parental potential income zit lowers (!
i
t and thus) the objective function V on [0; e^(e
g
t )), ultimately
making e(egt ) globally optimal. On the other hand, a value below e^(e
g
t ) may be more optimal when
zit is small.
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Figure 3. Public Education for the Poor
Notes: The diagram depicts how compulsory schooling a¤ects the fertility of a low-income household
(zit  z). Imposing a higher level of public education egt limits the supply of child labor lit and thus




t. The resulting rise in the cost of child-rearing induces fertility
decline (upper left panel).
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Figure 4. Public Education for the Rich
Notes: The diagram depicts how education policy a¤ects the fertility of a high-income household
(zit > z
). Increasing public education egt eases the nancial burden of private education eit (i.e.,
subsidiary e¤ect) and promotes fertility nit through the quality-quantity trade-o¤ (upper left panel).
The reaction curve eit = e(e
g




t ) = 0; so that
the household does not use child labor for any egt 2 [0;  ]:
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Figure 5. The Evolution of Public Education and Fertility over Stages III
Notes: The gure depicts the evolution of average fertility, nt; and the share of public education in
total government spending, egt = ; over the two stages. e
g
t = is initially limited by the poor opposing
against compulsory education, which discourages child labor and fertility while promoting techno-
logical progress. The sharp rise in public education between periods t  1 and t; accompanied by
fertility decline, was triggered by their shift from the use of child labor to the investment in child
education. The subsequent decline in public education and fertility results from the vicious cycle
in Figure 1.
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Figure 6. The Conditional Evolution of Average Fertility and Public Education in Stage I
Notes: The gure depicts the evolution of average fertility nt and public education e
g
t in Stage I for
a constant small pair (q; zb): The curve egt+1 = e
g(nt; ) indicates that a rise in nt; which becomes
the ratio of the adult to the old population in period t + 1; enlarges the government budget for
education, yet only up to  due to the opposition of the low-income, majority group b: The other
curve, derived from Figures 34, indicates the negative e¤ect of compulsory schooling on average
fertility. The gure shows a case in which the pair (egt ; nt) converges to a conditional steady-state
equilibrium. Although the dynamic behavior is generally ambiguous, it is certain that a positive
level of egt in each period lowers the growth path of nt:
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Figure 7. The Evolution of Average Fertility and Public Education in Stage II
Notes: The diagram depicts a downward spiral between population aging and the decline in public
education egt in Stage II, where all young households desire public education. As shown by the
curve egt+1 = e
g(nt; ), a rise in average fertility nt; which becomes the ratio of the adult to the
old population in period t + 1; raises the government budget for education towards  : The curve
nt = n
r(egt ); based on Figure 4, implies that public support for education promotes fertility. The
initial decline from nt 1 to nt reects the switch of group b from using child labor to investing
in the quality of children. The resulting population aging brings down public education from egt
to egt+1; and correspondingly average fertility drops from nt to nt+1. The economy converges
toward the steady-state equilibrium, which occurs at the largest intersection of the two curves.
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Figure 8. Augmentation of the Subsidiary E¤ect of Public Education
Notes: The gure shows the dynamic e¤ects of exogenously augmenting the subsidiary e¤ect of
public education egt . This structural change swings the fertility curve nt = n
r(egt ) rightward by
reducing private education for each egt > 0 (cf. Figure 4). As a result, the economy in the lower
steady-state equilibrium converges toward the new one through an upward spiral between fertility
and public education.
53
